For my part, I fail to see how an SA can be established
until there is a definition of what an SA is.

I consider the SA definition so fundamental that having
the definition phrased in traditional SCSI terms is
critical to me. This is why (as SPC-4 editor) I am
working on 06-369rx.

While it seems simpler to have the SA definition in
a working draft for easy reference by those writing
SA creation proposals (and there might be two of these
coming, one for authenticated SAs and one for
unauthenticated SAs), if the majority of CAP sees
things differently, I will of course abide by that
decision.

I still plan to press for a vote on 06-369.

All the best,

.Ralph

Gideon Avida wrote:
* From the T10 Reflector (t10@t10.org), posted by:
* "Gideon Avida" <gideon@decru.com>
*
While I understand the motivation behind proposal 06-369, I don't think
Decru can vote for it for similar reasons voiced against proposal 06-225 in
Colorado Springs. From the SSC-3 minutes: "Kevin Butt from IBM raised the
issue that this proposal relies on an already established security
association. It is the foundation for this key wrapping and we are opposed
to this without a method in SCSI defined to create a Security Association."

On a related topic, Decru would like to propose the use of public key
cryptography as an alternative means for securing data encrypting keys. Due
to time constraints between the meetings, I only have a rough overview that
I'd like to discuss in Nashua (it's currently submitted to the SSC-3
agenda). Please see http://www.t10.org/ftp/t10/document.06/06-389r0.pdf. If
there is interest in this approach, I will flesh out the details of the
proposal by the Las Vegas meeting.

Thanks,
Gideon

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-t10@t10.org [mailto:owner-t10@t10.org] On Behalf Of
Black_David@emc.com
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2006 2:49 PM
To: Gerry.Houlder@seagate.com; t10@t10.org
Subject: RE: comment on 06-369r2 -- Security Association Model for SPC-4

* From the T10 Reflector (t10@t10.org), posted by:
* Black_David@emc.com
*
Gerry,

  
It is also unclear if this security association method is required for
    
all
  
"security protocols" supported in SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/ OUT commands
    
or
  
just the tape protocol (which is the only one described in SPC-4 at
    
the
  
moment).
    

The function of the proposed security association abstraction is to
separate generation of symmetric cryptographic keys from use of those
keys
in order to enable mix/match of security mechanisms across that boundary
(separation of key generation from key usage).  If a "security protocol"
does not generate keys for use in other SCSI functionality, it can
ignore the whole concept of a security association.

The tape protocol is going to specify a means of encrypting encryption
keys in order to transfer them securely to tape devices that have
onboard
encryption - to do so, the protocol needs to use another key.  This may
sound recursive (need a second key to protect first key, how is the
second key protected?), but fortunately, the recursion ends with what
is called a "key exchange protocol" that generates a shared secret from
non-secret communication exchanges plus some mathematics.  One of the
reasons for putting forward security association text now is that there
is a possibility that SSC-3 will want to specify multiple key exchange
protocols, and a structure in which multiple such protocols can co-exist
cleanly is important to avoid chaos.

Thanks,
--David
----------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
----------------------------------------------------

  
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-t10@t10.org [mailto:owner-t10@t10.org] On Behalf 
Of Gerry.Houlder@seagate.com
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2006 3:44 PM
To: t10@t10.org
Subject: comment on 06-369r2 -- Security Association Model for SPC-4

* From the T10 Reflector (t10@t10.org), posted by:
* Gerry.Houlder@seagate.com
*

While reading through the new section 5.13, I thought the information
    
was
  
not organized in the best order for understanding. 5.13.1 and 5.13.2
introduce tables without describing what they are for. Clause 5.13.3
finally starts defining a "security association" and what it is used
    
for.
  
This should become the first clause in 5.13 because it provides a
    
basis for
  
understanding the stuff in the other clauses.

It is also unclear if this security association method is required for
    
all
  
"security protocols" supported in SECURITY PROTOCOL IN/ OUT commands
    
or
  
just the tape protocol (which is the only one described in SPC-4 at
    
the
  
moment).

I would like to see a more generic model that starts with material
    
from
  
5.13.1,5.13.3, and 5.13.4; then moves on to describe the choices made
    
for
  
the minimum SA parameters, etc. for the tape protocol. It should also
    
state
  
that the tape protocol details do not necessarily apply to protocols
    
that
  
reference other documents for their description.

*
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*
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