

Secure LU Access

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Background – security and SCSI

- ◆ Environment
 - ◆ Security is a major concern in the IT industry
 - ◆ Modern SAN environments should support multi-tenancy and server virtualization in a protected and secure way.
- ◆ SCSI security in reality
 - ◆ Today initiator and target communicate over a network. Target port is shared. Logical Unit may be shared.
 - ◆ No access control or security is applied
 - ◆ Rely on underlying transport service to provide that function



Background – SAN security in reality

- ◆ Security is applied in the FC layer (for FC SAN), consisting of port zoning and LU-to-port mapping and masking.
 - ◆ Static configurations that don't fit dynamic environments
 - ◆ Protection only - not security (no port authentication)
 - ◆ Covers connection, does not cover the logical semantics of the operations performed over the connection
 - ◆ LUN masking is non-standard, vendor-specific
 - ◆ Applies to ports which may be shared among logical hosts
 - ◆ Management is complex and error prone, TCO is high
- ◆ The combination of N_Port Virtualization (NPIV) and channel security (FC-SP) resolves only part of the above issues
 - ◆ and it's expensive
 - ◆ and it's specific to FC
 - ◆ The wrong level of abstraction (managing logical entities by ports...)



Proposed approach


- ◆ A new approach to SAN security: Apply to the logical level, implement in the SCSI protocol
 - ◆ Map **Object Storage Device (OSD) security model** to block devices
 - ◆ Object → Logical Unit
 - ◆ Suited for **server virtualization**: inherently logical rather than physical
 - ◆ Address security at command level rather than transport level – over operation rather than over connection
 - ◆ End-to-end – SCSI initiator to target, not involving FC/SAN components, independent on the SAN infrastructure.
 - ◆ Simplified management – uniform platform, one pane of glass



Our approach: Dynamic and secure access to LUN


- ◆ Provide a mechanism for dynamic policy enforcement
- ◆ Every access to a LUN must provide a credential, obtained from a security/policy manager
- ◆ The storage system grants/denies access based on the credential
- ◆ Credentials are cryptographic
 - Purely logical, not physical
 - Provides secure segregation between independent VMs
 - Supports VM migration
 - End-to-end, dynamic, integrated security involving servers and storage

Virtualization of Security





Use case scenario





Tentative structure of a secure command CDB

A "regular" command CDB...

... is encapsulated in a variable length CDB

Typical CDB for 16-byte commands

Bit Byte	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
0	OPERATION CODE							
1	miscellaneous CDB information				SERVICE ACTION (if required)			
2	(MSB)							
3								
4	LOGICAL BLOCK ADDRESS (if required)							
5								
6								
7								
8								
9								
10	(MSB)							
11								
12	TRANSFER LENGTH (if required) PARAMETER LIST LENGTH (if required) ALLOCATION LENGTH (if required)							
13								
14	miscellaneous CDB information							
15	CONTROL							

Bit Byte	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
0	OPERATION CODE (7Fh)							
1	CONTROL							
2	Reserved							
6	-----							
7	ADDITIONAL CDB LENGTH (116)							
8	(MSB)							
9	SERVICE ACTION (000Eh)							
10	-----							
11	Reserved							
12	-----							
27	REQUEST CDB							
28	-----							
83	CAPABILITY							
84	-----							
123	SECURITY PARAMETERS							

subject to review

Additional items in the protocol: Inquiry of security parameters; key exchange