

IEEE P1667

Authentication-Standard-for-Transient-Storage-Devices



IEEE

T10 Meeting
Austin, TX
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Why Such a Stupid Acronym...

- Dynamically Attached Devices and Device Interfaces Working Group
 - Is developing a “Standard Protocol for Authentication in Host Attachments of Transient Storage Devices”
- So suddenly P1667 doesn't sound all that bad...☺ (could have been worse 802.11 etc...)

What are Transient Storage Devices?

- TSD's are devices which offer removable mass storage capacities
 - Either as unique personal storage device or
 - Part of another device
- Provide invaluable features for enterprise users
 - Access to corporate data from any communications platform (phone, PDA, PC etc)
- Agnostic to Interface
 - Connection protocol
 - Form factor, connector (UFD, Memory Card, SIM)
 - Target host (PC or mobile device)

TSD's are Everywhere

- Huge user acceptance and comfort level
- Users educated about how to use Mass Storage devices
 - Agnostic to form factor
- Users want to transfer their TSD's between hosts and platforms seamlessly
 - Use same TSD in mobile device and PC

Transient Personal Storage Devices Are Great BUT

- Their popularity has security side effects
 - They get lost/stolen along with personal/sensitive information
 - They are an agent for transferring data without proper authorization
 - They enable the transport and execution of malicious software
- These side effects are particularly offensive in the enterprise/corporate world

Industry Reaction to Threat

- Enterprise users and corporate IT departments have increasingly limited access of TSD's to hosts in order to minimize threat
 - USB ports physically disabled by many companies
 - Inhibiting factor for large scale use of TSD's in mobile devices
 - Other ports can be blocked, too
 - Constraint on enterprise use of removable storage
- OS vendors will allow mechanisms for hosts to control mass storage device access
 - IT managers will enable/disable policy

Need for a Standard Authentication Solution

- Many device manufacturers began offering security applications together with their devices
 - Required drivers
 - Executables
 - No transparency on security scheme level or quality
- A Standard security scheme requires host side/OS involvement
- Changes to major OS's (PC, Mobile) can be made for a standard solution

Where IEEE P1667 Began

- P1667 spun off from USB-IF Secure-MSC specification
 - USB-IF BoD interested in focusing on access control (password based lock of device)
 - P1667 is lower layer. USB-IF MSC-lock spec (or any other access control scheme) runs on top of P1667 at Application Layer

Authentication for TSD's

- The Core requirement is to associate a TSD to a specific organization, person, device and location
- P1667 enables authentication of TSD to host and vice versa.
- Authentication initiated by host OS
 - Functionality “pulled” by host
 - Driverless
 - No executable

P1667 Use Cases

- Secure Enterprise
 - Authenticate the identity of the device and its ownership
 - Only allow authenticated devices to mount – authentication requires positive identification of the device. Device cannot enumerate before authentication
 - Access control is supplied by the host – device only needs a trusted ID
- Secure Device
 - Device will only mount according to access control rules
 - Device requires positive identification of the host it is attaching to before allowing the host to access it

P1667 Use Cases Cont.

- Secure Content
 - Device and host may not trust each other in the context of some secure data or licensed software
 - DRM system around data needs to authenticate the host, device, and a relationship between them
 - P1667 only focuses on the authentication of the components, not the access control mechanism

P1667 Migration to Mobile Devices

- Mobile devices use of TSD/MSC devices growing dramatically
 - Memory cards
 - USB connectors showing up, can connect UFD
 - MegaSIM
- P1667 protocol and command set designed to compliment all of these

P1667 and TCG

- TCG and P1667 closely collaborating
 - P1667 is “TCG’s Little Brother”
 - Where dedicated H/W not available, authentication performed via P1667 channel
 - Consistent with TCG command set and structure to assure all P1667 compliant devices can become TCG/TPM compliant when H/W becomes available on mass level.


Current P1667 Status

- Use case document complete
- Requirements document complete
- Specification draft available to members
- Command set requirements to be coordinated with relevant standards bodies to assure uniformity and conformity:
 - **T10 (SCSI)**, T13 (ATA), TCG, USB/DWG
 - Present work to OMA DRM, Security/Smart Cards Group, GSMA/SCaG

P1667 and MMC

- P1667 definitions allow to include an MMC card as a TSD
- P1667 WG prioritizing which TSD's to refer to in specification
 - Create implementation guideline
- Soliciting MMCA input cooperation on specification development to assure MMCA requirements addressed

IEEE P1667 Area of Responsibility



- IEEE P1667
- Security Services
- Hardware

Participation and Meetings

- Checkpoint, Kingston, Microsoft, M-Systems, Lexar Media, U3, Mobey Forum, Seagate, Dell, Aladdin, RSA, Mcafee, TCG
- Meetings every 6-8 weeks
- Next meeting November 1,2 New Jersey
- You can participate as guest with no voting right
- To gain voting right, company needs to join IEEE

THANK YOU!

For Further Information:

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