

To: T10 Committee
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Developed for **Trusted Computing Group**, www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
Subj: SPC-4 Security Commands proposal
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This document presents a proposal for defining an industry standard set of interface commands for a trusted device, which is a component of an overall trusted system.

A trusted device provides a horizontal security product embedded in devices whose behavior may be authorized via interaction with a trusted host system.

This proposal uses two commands: TRUSTED OUT and TRUSTED IN. These commands provide for variable length data transfers. These commands are 12 byte CDBs to provide portability between SCSI and ATAPI implementations.

The CDB parameters shall be defined by T10. The data payload and subsequent actions resulting from these commands are defined by the Trusted Protocol identified in the CDB. The intent is to standardize this data content so it is identical across both ATA and SCSI.

2.2 Approved References

- ITU-T RECOMMENDATION X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, *Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*, ITU, 2000.
- Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), International Organization for Standardization. International Standard 8824, (December, 1987).

2.4 IETF References

- RFC 3280, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*, IETF, 2002.
- RFC 3281, *An Internet Attribute Certificate: Profile for Authorization*, IETF, 2002.

3.1 Definitions

3.1.o Object Identifier (OID): An ASN.1 format (see 2.2) identifier for an object in or related to a certificate. See ISO/IEC 9834.

3.1.t Trusted Computing Group (TCG): An organization that develops and promotes open standards for hardware-enabled trusted computing and security technologies. See <https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org>.

3.2 Abbreviations

3.2.a ASN.1: Abstract Syntax Notation One (see 2.2).

3.2.o OID: Object Identifier (see 3.1.o).

3.2.t TCG: Trusted Computing Group (see 3.1.t).

4.3.4.4 Transfer length

[Note: No changes are proposed – included for reference only.]

The TRANSFER LENGTH field specifies the amount of data to be transferred, usually the number of blocks. Some commands use transfer length to specify the requested number of bytes to be sent as defined in the command description.

Commands that use one byte for the TRANSFER LENGTH field may allow up to 256 blocks or 256 bytes of data to be transferred by one command.

In commands that use multiple bytes for the TRANSFER LENGTH field, a transfer length of zero specifies that no data transfer shall take place. A value of one or greater specifies the number of blocks or bytes that shall be transferred.

Refer to the specific command description for further information.

4.3.4.6 Allocation length

[Note: For this clause, changes from current wording are underlined.]

The ALLOCATION LENGTH field specifies the maximum number of bytes or blocks that an application client has allocated in the Data-In Buffer. The field specifies bytes unless defined differently by the command.

An allocation length of zero specifies that no data shall be transferred. This condition shall not be considered as an error.

The device server shall terminate transfers to the Data-In Buffer when the number of bytes or blocks specified by the ALLOCATION LENGTH field have been transferred or when all available data have been transferred, whichever is less. The allocation length is used to limit the maximum amount of variable length data (e.g., mode data, log data, diagnostic data) returned to an application client. If the information being transferred to the Data-In Buffer includes fields containing counts of the number of bytes in some or all of the data, then the contents of these fields shall not be altered to reflect the truncation, if any, that results from an insufficient ALLOCATION LENGTH value, unless the standard that describes the Data-In Buffer format states otherwise.

If the amount of information to be transferred exceeds the maximum value that the ALLOCATION LENGTH field is capable of specifying, the device server shall transfer no data and terminate the command with CHECK CONDITION status, with the sense key set to ILLEGAL REQUEST, and the additional sense code set to INVALID FIELD IN CDB.

5.6.1 Persistent Reservations overview

[In table 31, add the TRUSTED IN and TRUSTED OUT commands as “allowed” for all 5 columns. The underlying protocol is expected to provide its own protection against interference from other initiators and this will eliminate reservations as a source of “denial of service” attacks.]

6.x Trusted Out command

The TRUSTED OUT command (see table 1) is used to send data to the device server. The data sent contains one or more instructions to be performed by the device server. The format and function of the instructions depends on the contents of the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 2). The application client uses TRUSTED IN command to retrieve data derived from these instructions.

Table 1 – Trusted Out command

Byte	Bit	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
0		OPERATION CODE (B5h)							
1		TRUSTED PROTOCOL							
2		TP_SPECIFIC							
3									
4									
5		RESERVED							
6									
7									
8	(MSB)	TRANSFER LENGTH							
9		(LSB)							
10		RESERVED							
11		CONTROL							

The TRUSTED PROTOCOL field specifies which trusted protocol is being used (see table 2).

Table 2 – TRUSTED OUT TRUSTED PROTOCOL field

Code	Description	Reference
00h	Reserved	
01h – 06h	Defined by the TCG	3.1.t
07h – EFh	Reserved	
F0h – FFh	Vendor specific	

The contents of the TP_SPECIFIC field depend on the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 2).

The TRANSFER LENGTH field (see 4.3.4.4) specifies the number of bytes to be sent and is expressed in increments of 512 bytes (e.g., a value of one means 512 bytes, two means 1 024 bytes, etc.). Pad bytes are appended as needed to meet this requirement. Pad bytes shall have a value of 00h.

The device server shall complete the command with GOOD status as soon as it determines the data has been correctly received. This does not indicate that the data has been processed. This indication is only obtained by sending a TRUSTED IN command and receiving the results in the associated data transfer.

The format of the data depends on the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 2).

6.y Trusted In command

6.y.1 Trusted In command description

The TRUSTED IN command (see table 3) is used to retrieve trusted protocol information (see 6.y.2) or the results of one or more TRUSTED OUT commands (see 6.x).

Table 3 – Trusted In command

Bit	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	
Byte									
0	OPERATION CODE (A2h)								
1	TRUSTED PROTOCOL								
2	TP_SPECIFIC								
3									
4									
5	RESERVED								
6									
7									
8	(MSB)	ALLOCATION LENGTH							
9									
10	RESERVED								
11	CONTROL								

The TRUSTED PROTOCOL field specifies which trusted protocol is being used (see table 4).

Table 4 – TRUSTED IN TRUSTED PROTOCOL field

Code	Description	Reference
00h	Trusted protocol information	6.y.2
01h – 06h	Defined by the TCG	3.1.t
07h – EFh	Reserved	
F0h - FFh	Vendor specific	

The contents of the TP_SPECIFIC field depend on the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 4).

The ALLOCATION LENGTH field (see 4.3.4.6) specifies the maximum number of bytes available to receive data and is expressed in increments of 512 bytes (e.g., a value of one means 512 bytes, two means 1 024 bytes, etc.). Pad bytes may be appended to meet this length. Pad bytes shall have a value of 00h. Indications of data overrun or underrun and the mechanism, if any, for processing retries depend on the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 4).

Any association between a previous TRUSTED OUT command and the data transferred by a TRUSTED IN command depends on the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 4). If the device server has no data to transfer (e.g., the results for any previous TRUSTED OUT commands are not yet available), the device server may transfer data indicating it has no other data to transfer. The command shall be completed with GOOD status unless a transport protocol failure (e.g., parity or CRC error) occurs.

The format of the data depends on the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 4).

The device server shall retain data resulting from a TRUSTED OUT command awaiting retrieval by a TRUSTED IN command until one of the following events is processed:

- a) transfer of the data via a TRUSTED IN command as defined by the protocol specified by the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field (see table 4);
- b) logical unit reset; or
- c) I_T nexus loss associated with the I_T nexus that sent the TRUSTED OUT command.

If the data is lost due to one of these events the application client may send a new TRUSTED OUT command to retry the instructions.

6.y.2 Trusted protocol information description

6.y.2.1 Overview

The purpose of TRUSTED PROTOCOL of 00h is to transfer trusted protocol related information from the logical unit. A TRUSTED IN command using TRUSTED PROTOCOL field set to 00h is not associated with an earlier TRUSTED OUT command.

If the TRUSTED IN command is supported, the TRUSTED PROTOCOL value of 00h shall be supported as defined in this standard.

6.y.2.2 CDB description

When the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field is set to 00h, the TP_SPECIFIC field contents are as shown in table 5.

Table 5 – TP_SPECIFIC field

Code	Description	Support	Reference
0000h	Supported trusted protocol list	Mandatory	6.y.2.3
0001h	Certificate data	Mandatory	6.y.2.4
0002h – FFFFh	Reserved		

All other CDB fields for TRUSTED IN command shall meet the requirements of 6.y.1.

Each time a TRUSTED IN command with TRUSTED PROTOCOL field set to 00h is received, the device server shall transfer the data defined by this subclause starting with byte 0.

6.y.2.3 Supported trusted protocols list description

When the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field is set to 00h and the TP_SPECIFIC field is set to 0001h in a TRUSTED IN command, the parameter data shall have the format shown in Table 6.

Table 6 – TRUSTED IN parameter data for TP_SPECIFIC 0000h

Bit	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	
Byte									
0	RESERVED								
1	RESERVED								
2	(MSB)	LIST LENGTH (m - 3)							
3								(LSB)	
4	SUPPORTED TRUSTED PROTOCOL LIST								
m									
m+1									
n	PAD BYTES (optional)								

The LIST LENGTH field indicates the total length, in bytes, of the supported trusted protocol list.

The SUPPORTED TRUSTED PROTOCOL LIST field shall contain a list of all supported TRUSTED PROTOCOL field values. Each byte indicates a supported TRUSTED PROTOCOL field value. The values shall be in ascending order starting with 00h.

The total data length shall conform to the ALLOCATION LENGTH field requirements. Pad bytes may be appended to meet this length. Pad bytes shall have a value of 00h.

6.y.2.4 Certificate data description

6.y.2.4.1 Certificate overview

A certificate is either an X.509 Attribute Certificate (see 6.y.2.3.3) or an X.509 Public Key Certificate (see 6.y.2.3.2) depending on the capabilities of the logical unit.

When the TRUSTED PROTOCOL field is set to 00h and the TP_SPECIFIC field is set to 0000h in a TRUSTED IN command, the parameter data shall have the format shown in Table 7.

Table 7 – TRUSTED IN parameter data for TP_SPECIFIC 0001h

Bit	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	
Byte									
0	RESERVED								
1	RESERVED								
2	(MSB)	CERTIFICATE LENGTH (m - 3)							
3								(LSB)	
4	CERTIFICATE								
m									
m+1	PAD BYTES (optional)								
n									

The CERTIFICATE LENGTH field indicates the total length, in bytes, of the certificate. This length includes one or more certificates. If the device server doesn't have a certificate to transfer, the certificate length shall be set to 0000h.

The contents of the CERTIFICATE field are defined in 6.y.2.3.2 and 6.y.2.3.3.

The total data length shall conform to the ALLOCATION LENGTH field requirements. Pad bytes may be appended to meet this length. Pad bytes shall have a value of 00h.

6.y.2.4.2 Public Key certificate description

RFC 3280 defines the certificate syntax for certificates consistent with X.509v3 Public Key Certificate Specification. Table 8 describes the trusted command usage of the X.509 public key certificate fields and the relationship of that usage to the definitions of RFC 3280.

Table 8 –Usage of X.509 certificate values in RFC 3280 context

Certificate Field [1]	Details
SignatureAlgorithm	As described in RFC 3280
SignatureValue	As described in RFC 3280
Version	Shall be set to 2 (i.e., version 3)
SerialNumber	As described in RFC 3280
Signature	As described in RFC 3280
Issuer	As described in RFC 3280 with the added constraint that UTF8String encoding of DirectoryString shall be used
Validity	As described in RFC 3280. The Begin Date should be set to the time of credential issuance. To indicate no expiration date, the Expiration Date should be set to the Begin Date plus 100 years.
Subject	As described in RFC 3280. Information contained in this field shall either be populated with a non-empty distinguished name identifying the device or a null value.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	As described in RFC 3280
subject Alternate Name Extension	As described in RFC 3280, but may be ignored. This standard restricts the use to the following options only: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) otherName; or b) directoryName. subjectAltName shall contain only one of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) The device serial number using directoryName; or b) The device serial number using otherName. If this field is used then Subject field shall contain a null value.
basicConstraints Extension	As described in RFC 3280
cRLDistributionPoints Extension	As described in RFC 3280
subjectDirectoryAttributes Extension: protocols	An ASN.1 sequence of OIDs
[1] Certificate field names are as described in RFC 3280.	

6.y.2.4.3 Attribute certificate description

RFC 3281 defines the certificate syntax for certificates consistent with X.509v2 Attribute Certificate Specification. Table 9 describes the trusted command usage of the X.509 attribute key certificate fields and the relationship of that usage to the definitions of RFC 3281.

Table 9 –Usage of X.509 certificate values in RFC 3281 context

Certificate Field [1]	Details
SignatureAlgorithm	As described in RFC 3281
SignatureValue	As described in RFC 3281
Version	Shall be set to 1 (i.e., version 2)
Holder	As described in RFC 3281 with the added constraint that entityName option shall contain one of the of the following values: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) an URI using uniformResourceIdentifier; b) the device serial number using directoryName or otherName; or c) a null value.
issuer	As described in RFC 3281
signature	As described in RFC 3281
serialNumber	As described in RFC 3281
attrCertValidityPeriod	As described in RFC 3281. The Begin Date should be set to the time of credential issuance. To indicate no expiration date, the Expiration Date should be set to the Begin Date plus 100 years.
attributes: protocols	An ASN.1 sequence of OIDs
basicAttConstraints Extension	As described in RFC 3281
cRLDistributionPoints Extension	As described in RFC 3281
[1] Certificate field names are as described in RFC 3281.	