

Security for Storage Data at Rest

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IEEE P1619

- Security for storage data at rest
- Standard security transform that provides confidentiality and pseudo-integrity

Applied to 512-byte blocks (up to 2¹²⁸ wide blocks)

Without data expansion (no additional integrity tag)

Resistant to copy-and-paste attacks

Parallelizable for high speed HW

Standard common format for key backup

Allows for decryption of a disk encrypted by any other vendor

Pseudo-Integrity Protection

Change in ciphertext produces random plaintext

The upper-layer applications will likely be "confused" by the result and detect the anomaly

 Pseudo-integrity is provided by "tweakable" or "nonmalleable" encryption modes

EME-32-AES (Encrypt-Mix-Encrypt, Halevi)

Protects the entire 512-byte wide block as a whole

LRW-AES (Liskov, Rivest, Wagner)

Protects individually each 16-byte narrow block

HW Implementations are 50% smaller

<u>ABL4</u> (Arbitrary Block Length, Mcgrew - Viega)

Recently proposed as an IP free alternative to EME-32-AES

Copy-and-Paste Attack





EME-32-AES (Wide-block)



LRW-AES (Narrow-block)



- Standard format to store keys and parameters of the security transform applied to the blocks
- XML format
- Keys are optionally encrypted with a keyencryption key
- ID, Standard Version, Key Scope, Transform, Keys
- Key scope expressed as:

KEY_SCOPE_START (LBA of first wide-block) KEY_SCOPE_LENGTH (number of wide-blocks)

CAP and P1619

- Is there any need for a wide-block size different from 512 bytes?
- Is there any need for a security transform for the extra 8 bytes that CAP is defining?
 - Integrity tag?

Encryption of all 520 bytes?

encrypt the first 518 bytes and add a CRC of ciphertext to allow downstream diagnosing?

• Other questions?

- SISWG web site <u>http://siswg.ieee.org/</u>
- Check mailing list archive for updated docs: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/
- Send comments at <u>stds-p1619@ieee.org</u>